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On the Behavior of Threshold Models over Finite Networks
Elie M. Adam, Munther A. Dahleh, and Asuman Ozdaglar
Abstract—We study a model for cascade effects over finite
networks based on a deterministic binary linear threshold model.
Our starting point is a networked coordination game where each
agent’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs coming from pairwise
interaction with each of the neighbors. We first establish that the
best response dynamics in this networked game is equivalent to
the linear threshold dynamics with heterogeneous thresholds over
the agents. While the previous literature has studied such linear
threshold models under the assumption that each agent may
change actions at most once, a study of best response dynamics
in such networked games necessitates an analysis that allows
for multiple switches in actions. In this paper, we develop such
an analysis. We first establish that agent behavior cycles among
different actions in the limit, we characterize the length of such
limit cycles, and reveal bounds on the time steps required to reach
them. We finally propose a measure of network resilience that
captures the nature of the involved dynamics. We prove bounds
and investigate the resilience of different network structures
under this measure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interactions over many different types of networks require
coordination between agents and their neighbors. For exam-
ple, in economic networks, technologies that conform to the
standards used by other related firms are more productive,
and in social networks, conformity to the behavior of friends
is valuable for a variety of reasons. The desire for such
coordination can lead to cascading behavior: the adoption
decision of some agents can spread to their neighbors and from
there to the rest of the network. One of the most commonly
used models of such cascading behavior is the linear threshold
model originally introduced by Granovetter [1]. This model is
used to explain a variety of aggregate level behaviors including
diffusion of innovation, voting, propagation of rumors and
diseases, spread of riots and strikes, and dynamics of opinions.
Most analyses of this model assume that one of the be-
haviors adopted by the agents (represented by the nodes of
a graph) is irreversible, meaning that agents can only make
a single switch into this behavior and can never switch out
from it. This assumption may be well justified in some settings
(e.g. educational attainment), however it is restrictive for many
other applications. For example, many of the behaviors in
social networks, corresponding to product choices, opinions
and actions, change regularly.
In this paper, we study a model of cascades based on
binary linear threshold dynamics. We start from an explicit
coordination game set over a finite undirected network. The
payoff of each agent is the sum of the payoff in a two
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player and two action coordination game the agent plays
pairwise with each of its neighbors (the action is fixed across
all interactions). We then study the behavior induced by
best response dynamics, whereby each agent changes the
played action to that which yields highest payoff given the
actions of the neighbors. We first establish that best response
dynamics are identical to the dynamics traced by the linear
threshold model with heterogeneous thresholds for the agents.
However, crucially, actions can change multiple times. Thus
the dynamics of interest for the set of problems posed here
cannot be studied using existing results and in fact have a
different mathematical structure. The main contribution of our
paper is to fully characterize the limiting behavior of these
dynamics.
We establish that agent behavior cycles among different
actions in the limit. Our analysis relies on first embedding the
dynamics (over any graph structure) into a bipartite structure
while preserving local properties, then transforming the paral-
lel dynamics into sequential dynamics to obtain desired results.
Using this technique, we show that the limit cycles consist
of at most two action profiles for any graph structure and
any threshold distribution over the agents. Substantively, this
means that in the limit, each player either sticks to playing one
particular action, or switches actions at every time step. We
also establish a uniform upper-bound on the time steps needed
to reach this cyclic behavior that is quadratic in the number of
agents. We mention that similar results on convergence cycles
and quadratic convergence time for linear threshold models
(termed differently) have appeared in the literature on Cellular
Automata in [12]. We approach the problem from a different
perspective and provide different insight. We further improve
the convergence time to be uniformly not more than the size
of the network whenever the graph in concern is a tree.
Of central importance in the study of cascades over net-
works is the resilience of networks to invasion by certain types
of behavior (e.g., cascades of failures or spread of epidemics).
For the new dynamics defined by our problem, we define
a measure of resilience of a network to such invasion that
captures the the minimal ‘cost of recovery’ needed when
the model is confronted with a perturbation in the agents’
action profile. We prove achievable uniform lower-bounds and
upper-bounds on the resilience measure, we list the resilience
measure of some network structures and provide basic insight
on how different network structures affect this measure.
Our paper is related to a large literature on network dynam-
ics and linear threshold models (see e.g., [2]-[7]). A number of
papers in this literature investigate the question of whether a
behavior initially adopted by a subset of agents (i.e., the seed
set) will spread to a large portion of the network, focusing
on the dynamics where agents can make a single switch
to one of the behaviors. Morris [2], while starting from a
multi-switch version of the dynamics, studied without loss of
generality the single-switch version to answer whether there
exists a finite set of initial adopters (in an infinite network
with homogeneous thresholds) such that the behavior diffuses
to the entire network. In [5], Watts derives conditions for
the behavior to spread to a positive fraction of the network
(represented by a random graph with given degree distribution)
using a branching process analysis. Similarly, Lelarge [6]
provides an explicit characterization of the expected fraction
of the agents that adopt the behavior in the limit over such
networks. Related work [4] studies how to target a fixed
number of agents (and change their behavior) in order to
maximize the spread of the behavior in the network in the
limit. In the context of network resilience, the recent paper
[7] adopts single-switch linear threshold dynamics as a model
of failures in a network. This work defines a measure of
network resilience that is a function of the graph topology
and the distribution over thresholds and studies this mea-
sure for different network structures focusing on d-regular
graphs (hence ignoring the effect of the degree distribution
of a graph on cascaded failures). Here we provide a novel
resilience measure that highlights the impact of heterogeneity
in thresholds and degrees of different agents. Finally, noisy
versions of best-response dynamics in networked coordination
games were studied in [8] and [9] (see also [10] and [11] in
the statistical mechanics literature). The random dynamics in
these models can be represented in terms of Markov chains
with absorbing states, and therefore do not exhibit the cyclic
behavior predicted by the multi-switch linear threshold model
studied in this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We begin by
a description of the model in section II. We then proceed
in section III to describe the general behavioral rules of the
dynamics. We branch out to characterize convergence cycles
and convergence time in sections IV and V. We finally propose
the network resilience measure in section VI.
II. MODEL
We define a networked coordination game. For a positive
integer n, we denote by In the set of n players.1For technical
convenience, we assume that In ⊂ Im for n < m.2 We define
Gn to be the class of all undirected graphs G(In, E) defined
over the vertex set In, with edge set E. To be proper, E is a
relation 3on In, but for convenience we will consider the set E
to have cardinality exactly equal to the number of undirected
edges. We denote an undirected edge in E by {i, j}, and we
abbreviate it to ij when no confusion arises. For G(In, E)
1We use the words player, agent, node and vertex interchangeably.
2We use the letters i and j to denote agents. We reserve the letter n for
the number of players in the game. If it is clear from the context to which set
X an element x belongs to, we refrain from mentioning the set X explicitly
to simplify notation. Moreover, for any function f with domain In, we will
denote f(i) by fi. In particular, for functions q, k and a with domain In,
q(i), k(i) and a(i) are denoted qi, ki and ai respectively.
3A (binary) relation R on a set A is a subset of A×A. We use the notation
aRb to denote (a, b) ∈ R.
in Gn, we use NG(i) to denote the neighborhood of player i
in G, i.e. NG(i) = { j ∈ In : ij ∈ E }. We denote by
dG(i) the degree of player i in G, namely the cardinality of
NG(i). We refer to NG(i) and dG(i) as Ni and di respectively,
when the underlying graph is clear from the context. We finally
define Qn to be the space of type distributions over the agents,
namely the set of maps from In into [0, 1]. For q in Qn, we
refer to qi as the type of player i.
Given a graph G(In, E), each player i in In plays one
action ai in {B,W}. For ij ∈ E, we define the payoff received
by agent i when playing ai against agent j playing aj to be
gi,j(ai, aj) =


qi if ai = aj = W
1− qi if ai = aj = B
0 if ai 6= aj
. (1)
The utility player i gets is the sum of the payoffs from the
pairwise interactions with the players in Ni, namely when
player j plays action aj ,
ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈Ni
gi,j(ai, aj), (2)
where a−i denotes the action profile of all players except i.
We define An be the space of action profiles4 played by
the agents, namely the set of maps from In into {B,W}.
The players are assigned an initial action profile a, we refer
to a as the action profile of the players at time step 0. For
T in N,5 every player best responds to the action profile of
the players at time step T − 1, by choosing the action that
maximizes its utility. We suppose that players play action W
as a tie breaking rule. Formally we impose a strict order on
{W,B} such that min{W,B} = W. Suppose we denote by
ai,T the action played by player i at time T , then given an
initial action configuration a in An, for every player i, we
recursively define:
ai,0 = ai
ai,T = min argmax
ai∈{W,B}
ui(ai, a−i,T−1), for T ∈ Z+, (3)
where the min operator breaks ties. The rule induced by the
recursive definition in (3) is equivalent to the rule provided in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let a be the initial action configuration,
namely the action profile of the players at time step 0. For
every positive integer T , player i plays action B at time step
T if and only if more than qidi neighbors of player i played
action B at time step T − 1.
Proof: We substitute ui in (3) with the expressions in (1)
and (2), and get that player i plays action B at time T if and
only if∑
j∈Ni
(1− qi)1{B}(aj,T−1) >
∑
j∈Ni
qi1{W}(aj,T−1), (4)
4We use the words profile and configuration interchangeably.
5We denote by N the set of non-negative integers, and by Z+ the set of
positive integers.
where 1Γ(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ Γ. Equivalently, player i
plays action B at time T if and only if∑
j∈Ni
1{B}(aj,T−1) > qidi. (5)
The left-side term is essentially summing the number of
neighbors of player i playing action B.
As a technical clarification, every player is capable of
switching actions both from W to B and B to W.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMICS
We begin by a coarse description of the involved dynamics.
To sum up the model, we consider a finite set of players In
along with three mathematical objects Gn, Qn and An. An
element G(In, E) of Gn corresponds to the network structure
imposed on the players, an element q of Qn refers to the type
distribution over the players, and an element a of An consists
an action profile played by the players. The triplet G, q and
a interact as dictated by Proposition 1.
A. From Types to Thresholds
Proposition 1 implies that playing B is never a best response
for player i if no player in Ni is playing B. We will generalize
our model to provide symmetry between both actions B and
W. We do this for two reasons. The first is to consider the
linear threshold model as considered in the literature. The
second is a technical reason, mainly to ensure closure of the
set Gn×Qn under certain operations. Nevertheless, any result
for the generalized version of the model is inherited by the
initial version trivially by inclusion.
We substitute the set Qn by a set Kn and then modify the
statement of Proposition 1. We define Kn to be the space of
threshold distributions over the agents, namely the set of maps
from In into N. We make a particular distinction between the
word type attributed to Qn and the word threshold attributed
to Kn. For k in Kn, we refer to ki as the threshold of player
i. Given a pair (G, k) with k ∈ Kn, we generalize Proposition
1 as follows:
Proposition 2: Let a be the initial action configuration,
namely the action profile of the players at time step 0. For
every positive integer T , player i plays action B at time step
T if and only if at least ki neighbors of player i played action
B at time step T − 1.
The rule in Proposition 2 supersets the rule in Proposition 1.
Indeed, for every q in Qn there exists a k in Kn such that
qidi may be substituted with the integer ki for all i without
changing the behavior of the players. It is also crucial to note
that more than is replaced by at least.
For G(In, E) in Gn and k in Kn, we denote by Gk the
map from An into An such that for player i, (Gka)i = B
if and only if at least ki players are in a−1(B) ∩ Ni. From
this perspective, given an initial configuration a in An, the
sequence a,Gka,G2ka, · · · 6corresponds to the sequence of
6Let f : A → B and g : B → C be functions, we denote by gf the
function g ◦ f : A → C. In particular, if a function f maps a set A to itself,
for a non-negative integer m, we denote by fm the function f◦fm−1 where
f0 is the identity map on A.
action profiles a, a1, a2, · · · where aT = GTk a is the action
profile played by the players at time T if they act in accordance
with the rule in Proposition 2.
B. The Limiting Behavior
To understand the limiting behavior, we note two funda-
mental properties: the space An has finite cardinality, and
Proposition 2 is deterministic. Since An is finite, if we
let a0, a1, a2, · · · be any infinite sequence of action profiles
played by the agents according to Proposition 2, then there
exists at least one action profile aˆ that will appear infinitely
many times along this sequence. This follows from the pigeon-
hole principle. Since the dynamics are deterministic (and aT+1
depends only on aT ), the same sequence of action profiles
appears between any two consecutive occurrences of aˆ. This
means that after a finite time step, the sequence of action
profiles will cycle among action profiles.
Let us consider a different representation of the dynamics.
We define a relation → on An such that for a and b in An,
a→ b if and only if b = Gka. Consider the graph H(An,→),
it forms a directed graph on the vertex set taken to be the space
of action profiles An, and an action profile a is connected to
an action profile b by a directed edge (a, b) going from a to b
if and only if b = Gka. Suppose we pick a vertex a, namely
an action configuration, and perform a walk on vertices along
the edges in H starting from a. The walk eventually cycles
vertices in the same order. Every initial action profile leads to
one cycle, and two action profiles need not lead to the same
cycle. We formalize the idea in the following definitions.
Definition 1: Given (G, k) in Gn × Kn, for two action
profiles a and b in An, it is said that a can be reached from
b with respect to Gk if there exists a non-negative integer T
such that a = GTk b. Formally, we define the relation RGk on
An such that for a and b in An, aRGkb if and only if there
exists a non-negative integer T such that a = GTk b.
If we construct a relation CGk on An such that for a and b
in An, aCGkb if and only if aRGkb or bRGka, then CGk is an
equivalence relation on An. Two configurations in An are in
the same equivalence class with respect to the relation CGk if
and only if one configuration can be reached from the other by
iteratively applying Gk. In this case, every equivalence class
consists of one cycle, we characterize the set of cycles:
Definition 2: Given a pair (G, k) in Gn×Kn, we define
CY CLEn(G, k) to be the collection of subsets of An, such
that for every C in CY CLEn(G, k), we have aRGkb for any
a and b in C, and for every c in An\C, there does not exist
an a in C such that aRGkc.
We refer to the elements of CY CLEn(G, k) as convergence
cycles. In this paper, we characterize both the convergence
cycles length (the number of action profiles consisting the
cycles) and the minimal number of time steps required to reach
such cycles from some initial action profile. We refer to the
latter as the convergence time.
IV. ON CONVERGENCE CYCLES
We begin by characterizing the length of the cycles in
the equivalence classes as a function of the imposed graph
structure and the threshold distribution.
Theorem 1: For every positive integer n, every (G, k) in
Gn ×Kn and every C in CY CLEn(G, k), the cardinality of
C is less than or equal to 2.
Put differently, given a network structure G, a threshold
distribution k and an initial action profile a, if we iteratively
apply Gk on a ad infinitum to get a sequence of best response
action profiles, along the sequence of actions considered by
player i, player i will eventually either settle on playing one
action, or switch action on every new application of Gk.
To prove the theorem, we begin by a lemma. We define
Sn to be the set of all pairs (G, k) in Gn×Kn such for each
player i, di has odd cardinality and ki is equal to (di + 1)/2.
We refer to Sn as the set of symmetric models, in the sense
that for (G, k) in Sn the property is such that for any action
profile a in An, and any player i, the action (Gk(a))i is the
action played by the majority in Ni with respect to the action
profile a. In this case, the two actions B and W are treated as
having equal weights by all players in the network.
Let us define M to be the subset of
⋃
n Gn×Kn such that
for each (G, k) in M and every C in CY CLEn(G, k), the
cardinality of C is less than or equal to 2.
Lemma 1: If Sn belongs to M for all n, then Gn × Kn
belongs to M for all n.
Proof: Given a pair (G, k) in (Gn×Kn)\Sn, we construct
a pair (G′, k′) in G′n × K′n as follows. We suppose that
G is equal to (In, E), and choose a player i in In such
that either di is even, or di is odd and ki is not equal to
(di + 1)/2. Surely such a node exists since (G, k) does not
belong to Sn. We call the node i the pivot node in the one-
step symmetric-expansion of (G, k) into (G′, k′). Let bi be
an integer equal to ki, and consider wi an integer equal to
di−bi+1. In this sense, if a is an action configuration in An,
bi would be considered to be the least number of B-playing
neighbors needed by player i to play B when Gk acts on a,
whereas wi would be the least number of W-playing neighbors
needed by player i to play W. We shall construct an instance
(G′, k′) in Gn+3bi+3wi×Kn+3bi+3wi . We suppose that G′
is equal to (In+3bi+3wi , E′) and partition In+3bi+3wi into
In, Pw1 , · · · , P
w
bi
, P b1 , · · · , P
b
wi
where each partition different
than In has cardinality exactly equal 3. We define E′ to be the
undirected set of edges such that E′ contains E. Furthermore,
for every m, suppose Pwm = {j, j′, j′′}, we let E′ contain jj′,
jj′′ and ij. Similarly, for every l, suppose P bl = {j, j′, j′′} we
let E′ contain jj′, jj′′ and ij. To visualize the obtained graph
structure G′, we attached bi + wi 3-node Y-shaped graphs to
node i. Finally, we set k′ to be equal to k on In\{i},7 equal
to (di + bi +wi)/2 = di +1 at i, equal to 2 on the remaining
nodes having degree 3 and equal to 1 everywhere else.
We define the map α from An into An+3bi+3wi in such
a way that for a in An, α(a) is equal to a on In, B on
7Let X be a set. For A and B subsets of X , we denote by A\B the subset
of X containing elements in A that are not in B.
P b1 ∪ · · · ∪ P
b
wi
and W on Pw1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pwbi . One could check
that for a in An:
α(Gka) = G
′
k′α(a). (6)
Let C = {a1, · · · , ak} be a cycle in CY CLEn(G, k), then
C ′ = {α(a1), · · · , α(ak)} is a cycle in CY CLEn(G, k).
Since α is an injective map, then |C ′| = |C|. Therefore, if
(G′, k′) belongs to M, then (G, k) belongs to M. If (G′, k′)
does not belong to Sn′ , choose a player j, where dj is
even or kj is not equal to (dj + 1)/2. Repeat the procedure
described above to obtain a pair (G′′, k′′). In this case, if
(G′′, k′′) belongs to M, then (G′, k′) belongs to M. We repeat
this procedure until we obtain a pair (G¯, k¯) in Sn¯, we need
only repeat it finitely many times. The result then follows by
transitivity.
Definition 3: Let P be a subset of In, for (G, k) in Gn×Kn,
we define Gk|P to be the restriction of Gk to act on the actions
of the players in P . Formally, for a in An,
(Gk|Pa)i =
{
(Gka)i if i ∈ P
ai if i /∈ P
(7)
Note that we are not restricting the domain of the function.
Proof of Theorem 1: Without loss of generality, let (G, k)
be a pair in Sn (see Lemma 1). We construct a pair (G′, k′)
in S2n as follows. Suppose G′ is equal to (I2n, E′), then
partition I2n into two sets In and J . We will denote In by I
throughout this proof. We define a bijection φ from J into I
and we define E′ to be the set of edges on I2n such that for
i, j in I2n, {i, j} ∈ E′ if and only if {i, φ(j)} ∈ E. Define α
to be the map from A2n into A2n such that α(aI , aJ ) is equal
to aI on In and aJ on Jn. For (aI , aJ ) in A2n, we then get
G′k′ |Iα(aI , aJ ) = α(GkaJ , aJ ), (8)
and therefore,
G′k′ |JG
′
k′ |Iα(aI , aJ ) = α(GkaJ , G
2
kaJ ). (9)
This said, it can be checked that CY CLEn(G, k) contains
only cycles of cardinality at most two, if and only if for every
a in A2n, there exists a point b in A2n, such that
b = (Gk|IGk|J )
Ta (10)
for some non-negative integer T and
(G′k′ |JG
′
k′ |I)b = b. (11)
To show the result we seek existence of such a configuration
b. Let us define the map E from A2n into N such that E(a) =
|{ ij ∈ E′ : ai 6= aj }| for a in A2n. Then, for every action
configuration a in A2n, we have G′k′ |Ia 6= a if and only if
E(G′k′ |Ia) < E(a). To see that, note that since (G′, k′) is in
S2n, (G
′
k′a)i is equal to the majority of the actions in Ni.
Then player i switches action if and only if it can decrease
the number of players with opposite actions. By symmetry, we
get a similar claim for J . It follows that G′k′ |JG′k′ |Ia 6= a if
and only if E(G′k′ |JG′k′ |Ia) < E(a). Since E(a) is bounded
above by 2n2 and bounded below by 0, it follows that such a
b exists.
Given a pair (G, k), we refer to the symmetric expansion of
(G, k) as the pair (G′, k′) in ∪nSn generated by the procedure
described in Lemma 1. Given a pair (G, k), we refer to the
bipartite expansion of (G, k) as the pair (G′, k′) generated by
the procedure described in Theorem 1, whereby the graph is
first duplicated, then the two copies are cross-connected.
To explain the proof idea, let (G, k) be a pair in ∪nSn, let
a0 be a point of An and consider the sequence a1, a2 · · · with
aT = Gk(aT−1) for every positive integer T . By performing
a bipartite expansion on (G, k) to get (G′, k′) and applying
G′k′ |InG
′
k′ |Jn iteratively on α(a, a), the players in In will
play the action profiles having even indices in the sequence,
whereas the players in J will play the action profiles having
odd indices in the sequence. From this perspective, it is easy
to understand that the cycles of CY CLEn(G, k) consist of
at most two configurations if and only if iteratively applying
Gk|IGk|J , starting from any configuration, always leads to a
fixed point. It is better to think of the process as sequential,
where players in I update at even time steps, and players in
J update at odd time steps. The proof idea to follow stems
from the fact that two players updating on the same time steps
share no edges in common. Let us refer to an edge connecting
two players with opposite actions as a conflict edge. Since we
enforced the symmetric assumption on the model (i.e. (G, k)
belongs to Sn), a node switches action (whenever it is allowed
to update) if and only if it can decrease the number of conflict
edges in the graph. Therefore, every player cannot switch
actions infinitely many times since the number of conflict
edges cannot keep on decreasing indefinitely.
V. ON CONVERGENCE TIME
Given a graph structure G, a threshold distribution k, and
an action profile a, we characterize the number of times one
needs to apply Gk on a to reach a cycle.
Definition 4: For every positive integer n, and every
(G, k, a) in Gn×Kn×An, we define δn(G, k, a) to be equal
to the smallest non-negative integer T such that there exists a
cycle C in CY CLEn(G, k) and b in C with GTk a = b.
The quantity δn(G, k, a) denotes to the minimal number of
iterations needed until a given action configuration a reaches
a cycle, when iteratively applying Gk. We refer to δn(G, k, a)
as the convergence time from a under Gk.
Theorem 2: For all positive integers n, and every (G, k, a)
in Gn×Kn×An, the convergence time δn(G, k, a) is less than
or equal to mn2 for some positive integer m.
Proof: Let (G, k) be a point in Gn ×Kn for some n, let
(G′, k′) be the symmetric expansion of (G, k) in Sn′ , and let
(G′′, k′′) be the bipartite expansion of (G′, k′) in S2n′ . Then:
δn(G, k) ≤ δn′(G
′, k′) ≤ δ2n′(G
′′, k′′). (12)
Moreover, we have:
δ2n′(G
′′, k′′) ≤ max
a∈An′′
|{ ij ∈ E′′ : ai 6= aj }|
≤ 2|E′| ≤ 2[n2 + 3
∑
i∈In
bi + wi]. (13)
Since
∑
i∈In
bi + wi =
∑
i∈In
di + 1 = 2|E|+ n, the result
follows.
The constant m in the theorem statement can be optimized,
but it is of no interest. Instead, it would interesting to prove
a bound below quadratic. In what follows, we improve the
convergence time upper-bound to be linear in the size of the
network when the graph structure is a tree.
Theorem 3: For all positive integers n and every (G, k, a)
in Gn×Kn×An where G is a tree, the convergence time
δn(G, k, a) is less than or equal to n.
Definition 5: Given a bipartite graph G(In, E) in Gn, a 2-
Partition of In with respect to G, is a pair (Po, Pe) of disjoint
subsets of In such that Po∪Pe = In and there does not exist
an (i, j) in P 2o ∪ P 2e such that ij ∈ E.
Definition 6: Given a triplet (G, k, a) in Gn×Kn×An and
a 2-Partition (Po, Pe) of In with respect to G. We identify a
with the pair (a↾Po, a↾Pe).8 It is said that a↾Po is reachable in
(G, k) if there exists a′ in An such that a↾Po = (Gk|Poa′)↾Po.
In this case, it is said that a′↾Pe induces a↾Po. Similarly, a↾Pe
is reachable in (G, k) if there exists a′ in An such that a↾Pe =
(Gk|Pea
′)↾Pe. And again, it is said that a′↾Po induces a↾Pe.
Lemma 2: For every positive integer n, given a triplet
(G, k, a) in Gn×Kn×An where G is a tree and a 2-Partition
(Po, Pe) of In with respect to G. If a↾Po is reachable and
a↾Po induces a↾Pe both in (G, k), then there exists a player i
in Pe, such that ((Gk|PeGk|Po)Ta)i = ai for all non-negative
integers T .
Whenever the graph G in concern is bipartite, we decouple
the process. That is, we consider a 2-Partition (Po, Pe) of G,
and (instead of simultaneous update) we let the nodes in Po
update at odd time steps and the nodes in Pe update at even
time steps. The lemma claims that if the stated conditions are
met, at least one player in Pe will never switch his action
along this sequential process. We refer the reader to [13] for
the proof of Lemma 2. We prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let G be a tree in Gn, and consider
a 2-Partition (Po, Pe) of In with respect to G such that
|Pe| ≤ |Po|. For any k in Kn and a in An, if we consider
(ao, ae) = (Gka↾Po, G
2
ka↾Pe), then ao is reachable, and ao
induces ae. Then by Lemma 2, there exists at least one node
i in Pe such that ((Gk|PeGk|Po)m(ao, ae))i = aei for all
non-negative integers m. We can remove this player from the
game, obtain a graph G′ and modify the threshold distribution
accordingly to obtain a threshold distribution k′ (See [13]
for details). By successive application of Lemma 2 on the
connected components, we exhaust all nodes in Pe in at most
2|Pe| time steps. But since |Pe| ≤ |Po|, we get |Pe| ≤ n/2
and the result follows.
We end this section with a conjecture: the convergence time
δn(G, k, a) is less than or equal to n whenever G is bipartite.
In this case, δn(G, k, a) will necessarily be less than or equal
to 2n when G is non-bipartite.
8Let f be a map from A into B, and let A′ be a subset of A. We denote
by f↾A′ the restriction of the function f to A′.
VI. RESILIENCE OF NETWORKS
In this section, we revert back to consider types instead
of thresholds, namely Qn instead of Kn. All the needed
definitions in this paper including Kn naturally extend to the
set Qn. Mainly, for G(In, E) in Gn and q in Qn, we denote
by Gq the map from An into An such that for player i,
(Gka)i = B if and only if more than qidi players are in
a−1(B) ∩ Ni. We further redefine Gn to be the class of all
connected undirected graphs defined over the vertex set In.
We consider the following resilience problem. We define
||.||1 to be the map from Qn into R such that for q in Qn:
||q||1 =
∑
i∈In
qi. (14)
We restrict the analysis in the paper to ||.||1. Let K be a
positive integer, we denote by AKn the subset of An such
that, a is in AKn if and only if the cardinality of a−1(B) is
at most K. We denote respectively by Wn and Bn the points
(W, · · · ,W) and (B, · · · ,B) in An, and given a graph G in
Gn, define QG,Kn to be the subset of Qn such that for every
q in QG,Kn and a in AKn , WnRGqa. We define the resilience
measure of a graph G with respect to K deviations to be:
µKn (G) = inf{ ||q||1 : q ∈ Q
G,K
n }. (15)
Given a graph structure G and a positive integer K, we
suppose that at most K players in the network start playing
action B. The goal is to allocate a type distribution q to the
players, so that the dynamics depicted in Proposition 1 lead the
agents to play action W at the limit. From this perspective, the
measure µ captures the minimal cost of threshold investment
required to recover the network G from a perturbation of
magnitude K. The lower the resilience measure is for a graph
G, the more robust G is against perturbations, in that we mean
the less costly it is to allocate types to have G recover. We
state some bounds, we refer the reader to [13] for the proofs.
Theorem 4: The resilience measure µKn is greater than or
equal to 1 for every positive integer K ≤ n.
Theorem 5: The resilience measure µKn is less than or equal
to n/2 for every positive integer K ≤ n.
One can show that the lower-bound is achieved by the star
network for every positive integer K. The upper-bound is
achieved by the 2-regular graph for K > n/2. As a piece
of insight, high degree nodes lower the resilience measure in
the graph. One manifestation of this fact lies in the examples
that meet the bounds. However, if we consider the complete
graph, it has a resilience measure of 1 for K = 1 that grows
to n/2 for K = n. This said, although high degree nodes
increase the resilience of a network, having a large number
of high degree nodes in the network makes the network more
fragile against large perturbation, and hence more costly to
ensure its recovery.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on characterizing the behavior of
a linear threshold model where agents are allowed to switch
their actions multiple times. We established that in the limit,
the agents in the network cycle among action profiles and
proceeded to characterize the lengths of such cycles, and the
required number of time steps needed to reach such cycles.
In particular, we showed that for any graph structure and any
threshold distribution over the agents, such cycles consist of
a most two action profiles. Namely, in the limit, each agent
either always plays one specific action or switches action at
every single time step. We also showed that over all graph
structure (of size n) and all threshold distributions no more
than mn2 time steps are required to reach such cycles. Our
methods follow a combinatorial approach, and are based on
two techniques: transforming the general graph structure into a
bipartite structure, and transforming the parallel dynamics on
this bipartite structure into sequential dynamics. We further
improve the convergence time bound to be not more than n
time steps if the graph structure is a tree.
Finally, in the setting of resilience of networks, we defined
a measure µ that captures the minimal cost of threshold invest-
ment required to recover the network G from a perturbation of
magnitude K, whereby we suppose that K agents will initially
deviate from action W and play action B. We show that this
measure is lower-bounded by 1, and that this measure is upper-
bounded by n/2, where n is the size of the network. We
finally provide an interpretation of how this measure varies
with respect to the network structures. High degree nodes add
resilience to the network, however too many high degree nodes
can make the network fragile against strong perturbations.
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